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REVIEW: WILLIAM L. TAYLOR, THE PASSION OF MY
TIMES: AN ADVOCATE'S FIFTY-YEAR JOURNEY IN THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
Leon Friedman*
Defining justice has always been a problem for philosophers. In the
eighteenth century, Adam Smith argued that one's sense of justice depends
upon:
reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the
man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct. ... [H]e,
who, whenever we are about to act so as to affect the happiness
of others, calls to us with a voice capable of astonishing the most
presumptuous of our passions, that we are but one of the
multitude, in no respect better than any other in it .... I
Smith saw that "for one man to deprive another unjustly of any thing,
or unjustly to promote his own advantage by the loss or disadvantage of
another, is more contrary to nature, than death, than poverty, than pain, than
all the misfortunes which can affect him .... ,2 Martha Nussbaum refers to
the "ancient pity tradition" among early societies, in which each person
knew that he or she was part of a social community in which any offense or
transgression against another, if not corrected, could return against oneself
Edmond Cahn, the great philosopher, teacher, author, and lawyer,
defined justice in the opposite way. He was not concerned with what
created a feeling of fairness and equity among humans. Rather, he looked
at what actions or events created a sense of injustice among civilized human
beings. "Justice," he wrote, "means the active process of remedying or
preventing what would arouse the sense of injustice. 'A He assumed that
most of us find it easier to recognize what is evil or unfair in society and
* Joseph Kushner Distinguished Professor of Civil Liberties Law, Hofstra University School
of Law; LL.B. 1960, Harvard Law School; A.B. 1954, Harvard University.
1. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 216 (Philadelphia, Anthony Finley
1817)(1759).
2. Id.at 218.
3. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE 65-67 (1995). See generally Marcus Dirk
Dubbler, Making Sense of the Sense of Justice, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 815 (2005) (attempting to define the
"sense of justice" as it appears in literature and theory). Among the more successful attempts at defining
this idea is JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971), in which the author postulates that the fairest
and most just society would evolve from persons selecting governing rules from behind a "veil of
ignorance." They would not know which group they belonged to and thus would not establish rules that
favored that group over others.
4. EDMOND N. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 13-14 (1949) (emphasis omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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react against it rather than develop an abstract sense of what is morally
correct or just.5
The great injustice in our society in the twentieth century has been
inflicted against our minority populations. William Taylor's The Passionof
My Times: An Advocate's Fifty-Year Journey in the Civil Rights Movement
provides an intimate look into many of the legal battles that brought about
significant improvements in the area of civil rights in this country over
during the last half-century. 6 However, the injustices continue to this day.
In one of the great debates over affirmative action in the Supreme Court,
Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer recently pointed out the continued
disadvantages faced by our minority population:
In the wake "of a system of racial caste only recently
ended," large disparities endure. Unemployment, poverty, and
access to health care vary disproportionately by race.
Neighborhoods and schools remain racially divided. AfricanAmerican and Hispanic children are all too often educated in
poverty-stricken and underperforming institutions.
Adult
African-Americans and Hispanics generally earn less than whites
with equivalent levels of education. Equally credentialed job
applicants receive different receptions depending on their race.
Irrational prejudice is still
encountered in real estate markets and
7
consumer transactions.
Fifty years ago, the problems were worse. Not only were AfricanAmericans at the bottom of the health, education, and income scales, but
they suffered serious legal disabilities as well. Laws in the southern states
provided for separate parks, libraries, transportations facilities, theaters, and
even courtrooms.8 Blacks were deprived of the right to vote through
numerous legal tricks: limited registration periods, biased registrars, literacy

5. Id. at 13.
6. WILLIAM L. TAYLOR, THE PASSION OF MY TIMES: AN ADVOCATE'S FIFTY-YEAR JOURNEY

INTHE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2004) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
7. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299-300 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal
footnotes and citations omitted) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 273 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg cites figures showing that the poverty rate
among African-Americans was twice to three times that of the white community. Id. at 299 n.2. Blacks
also have a life expectancy that is between six and eight years less than that of the majority, in part the
result of greater difficulty in obtaining health insurance. See Maryann Cusimano Love, Race in
America, AMERICA, Feb. 12, 2007 (recounting the current life expectancy and poverty rates among
African-Americans), available at http://lifecycle.cua.edu/InTheMedia.
8.

Leon Friedman, Preface to BROWN v. BOARD: THE LANDMARK ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE

THE SUPREME COURT, at viii (Leon Friedman ed., 2004).
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tests, and the like. 9 Laws in seventeen states and Washington, D.C.
provided for segregated schools.' 0 Indeed the landmark case, Brown v.
Board of Education, involved consolidated cases from Kansas, Delaware,
Virginia, and South Carolina."
Beyond the actual legal disabilities, there was the application of what
Professor Peter R. Teachout has called "underlaw": "local white custom
translated into effective law, usually without the help of articulated state
legislation."' 12
Professor Teachout further defined the term as "the
systematic exploitation of areas of discretion in the legal process in order to
perpetuate a system of white supremacy."' 3 This definition is particularly
relevant to an examination of William Taylor's memoirs because enormous
discretion exists at every stage of the legal system--who to arrest, and who
not to arrest, who to charge with what offense, and who to sentence for
what term of imprisonment. If southern sheriffs refuse to arrest killers of
civil rights activists and arrest those who try to register black voters, we
have a different system of law than that existing in the statute books.
There were few lawyers around in the 1950s and 1960s who confronted
this injustice and were prepared to fight against it. William Taylor is
among them. Taylor, a 1950 graduate of Brooklyn College, was one of the
few white lawyers of the time whose sense of injustice led him to devote
his
14
entire legal career to fight for the legal rights of our minority citizens.
The NAACP had financed a series of cases from the 1930s to the early
1950s attacking states that did not provide equal graduate facilities for their
black students.' 5 Charles H. Houston of Howard Law School plotted the
strategy and handled the cases with one of his prize students, Thurgood
Marshall. Marshall later developed a separate legal arm called the NAACP
9. E.g. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 52-55 (2004).
10. GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YUN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV.,
RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 12 (1999).

11. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483,486 (1954).
12. Peter R. Teachout, Louisiana Underlaw, in SOUTHERN JUSTICE 57, 59-60 (Leon Friedman
ed., 1965).
13. Id.
14. Taylor had a confrontation with the President of Brooklyn College, Harry D. Gideonse,
because of Taylor's activities on the college newspaper. Taylor clearly delights in relating the story,
which he does several times in his memoirs. Pp. 1-2, 80, 101.
15. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-36 (1950) (holding that the law school created by
Texas for African-American students consisted of unequal facilities, violating petitioner's Fourteenth
Amendment rights); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1950)
(asserting that Oklahoma is required to provide equal graduate educational facilities for all students);
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (requiring Missouri to provide equal
facilities for law students, regardless of race, and regardless of the number of students that seek such an
education).
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Legal Defense Fund, Inc. (LDF), which handled the cases that led to Brown
v. Board of Education. When William Taylor joined LDF, Marshall had the
assistance of a group of brilliant lawyers in both Washington, D.C. and
across the country: Robert L. Carter, who later became a senior federal
district court judge in New York; Constance Baker Mottley, who eventually
joined Carter as a federal district judge in New York; Spottswood
Robinson, who later sat on the Court of Appeals in the District of
Columbia; James Nabrit, Jr., who later became dean of Howard Law
School; Elwood Chrisholm, a former professor at Howard Law School;
Louis Redding, who in 1929 became the first black attorney admitted to
practice law in Delaware; as well as a few white lawyers such as Jack
Greenberg, now a professor at Columbia Law School.' 6 These lawyers
country, and
proved to be some of the most influential legal minds in the
7
Taylor credits them with shaping the initial arc of his career.
Even after Brown was won, there was much to do. The principle of
Brown-that legal separation of the races violated the equal protection
clausel 8-required a new round of legal challenges to the structure of white
supremacy.' 9 Taylor arrived at LDF shortly after Brown I in 1954 and
promptly set to work under Robert Carter on legal initiatives aimed at
expanding the scope of the decision.2 ° Initially, LDF lawyers had to file
new briefs on the topic of what remedy federal courts should require to
ensure that segregation in all schools would be eliminated. As part of this
effort, Taylor worked with Robert Carter, who ran the New York office of
LDF, and others on Brown II. In 1955, in its infamous Brown II decision,
the Supreme Court delayed school desegregation by requiring states to
comply with the mandate "with all deliberate speed.'
While at LDF Taylor also worked on other areas of civil rights law,
including workplace discrimination against blacks in the oil industry in
Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana, as well as the battle against segregation in
interstate facilities-primarily bus and train terminals and the restaurants
within those terminals.22 While canvassing his career at LDF, Taylor
spends considerable time describing the small group of lawyers who
worked on the desegregation cases. Taylor paints a vivid picture of
William Coleman, one of the few black members of the Harvard Law
Review, a clerk for Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, and later
16. Pp. 14-15.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Pp. 18-21.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown]), 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
P.20.
Pp. 15-18.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
Pp. 14-15.
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Secretary of Transportation in President Ford's administration.23
Taylor was drafted in 1956 and returned to LDF after a brief stint with
the Army.24 He then worked on the next great crisis in the civil rights
struggle, the integration of Little Rock Central High School. Taylor calls
this work the high point of his career at LDF and describes the situation
with great verve. 25 Federal courts had ordered desegregation of that school
commencing in the fall term of 1957. Governor Orval Faubus, catering to
the white supremacists in his state, called out the Arkansas National Guard
to block the integration order. That forced President Dwight Eisenhower to
uphold the court orders. He did so by federalizing the National Guard and
requiring them to protect, rather than block, the black students who had
been admitted. Litigation followed, leading to the Supreme Court's special
term in August 1958, in which Thurgood Marshall argued for the students
in Cooper v. Aaron.2 6 The Court, in a joint opinion composed by all nine
Justices, laid out the basic principle that court orders must be obeyed:
[Marbury v. Madison] declared the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by
this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable
feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this
Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and
Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the
States "any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the
' 27
Contrary notwithstanding."
At that early point in his career, Taylor believed that working on
individual litigation was too quiet for him. "[B]y the end of 1958 I was
ready to strike out on a new path, one where I might see more of the world
than the inside of a book-lined law office. 2 8 He then moved to the center
of civil rights politics, working as a lobbyist for Americans for Democratic
Action (ADA), led by Joseph Rauh, a leading Washington, D.C., civil rights
lawyer. The ADA was one of the leading progressive organizations of the
time, working on civil rights and welfare legislation. Taylor prepared
23. Pp. 18-20. Taylor's treatment of Coleman is one of the many instances in which Taylor
enriches his memoirs by indulging the reader with amusing stories of effective advocacy by significant
figures in the civil rights movement.
24. P. 25.
25. Pp. 25-27.
26. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 3 (1958).
27. Id. at 18.
28. P.29.
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testimony, secured expert witnesses, and testified himself on many
occasions, working on legislation that eventually became the basis for
Medicare and the seminal civil rights acts of the 1960s. He also worked on
rear-guard measures, fighting against McCarthy-era laws that would restrict
civil liberties.2 9
After John F. Kennedy was elected President in 1960, he set up an
interdepartmental committee to press for additional legal measures to
advance equal rights. Taylor joined the government and worked on the
Sub-cabinet Committee on Civil Rights, which drafted measures within
each governmental department to eliminate racially offensive activities.
The subcommittee took on such issues as ending the segregation of
restaurants in federal buildings and forbidding government meetings in
hotels that were segregated. The Kennedy Administration went further and
issued an executive order prohibiting government agencies from entering
into contracts with companies that discriminated in employment. 30 Taylor
worked on a proposed executive order that would require all federal
agencies that guaranteed loans for financial institutions to insure that no
loans would be used to further segregated housing. Work on the order took
more than a year with many agencies objecting. It was only after the
Kennedy Administration was able to appoint new members to various
federal agencies that such an order was issued, and the administration
waited until after the 1962 congressional elections to act.
Beginning in 1963, the Kennedy Administration began its effort to pass
a comprehensive civil rights law, covering only public accommodations and
the effort to end school segregation. Taylor worked on additional proposals
that would permit the granting of federal funds only to entities that would
eliminate discrimination. This proposal eventually became part of Title VI
to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 31 Republicans generally opposed the
proposals, as did southern Democrats. Nothing came 6f the initial efforts
until Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, and President Lyndon
Johnson put the entire weight of the Administration behind the proposals.
The growing civil rights drive in the South led by Martin Luther King, Jr.,
the brutal suppression of the protests in Birmingham in April 1963, and
King's famous I Have a Dream speech in August 1963 inspired growing
political support for the civil rights law. It finally passed in June 1964,
adding the bedrock provisions of our current law to fight discriminationTitle I (prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation), Title
VI (forbidding discrimination in all federally funded programs), and Title
29. P. 31.
30.

P. 41.

31.

4
Pp.44- 8.
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VII (prohibiting employment discrimination by reason of race, color,
national origin, or gender).32
In the meantime, Taylor moved to yet another civil rights position, this
time as general counsel to the United States Commission on Civil Rights,
an independent agency that investigated civil rights abuses, particularly in
the South.33 Taylor led an inquiry into the efforts of Mississippi state
officials to restrict the voting rights of minority citizens. Despite a strong
effort by the Johnson Administration to sidetrack the hearings (its excuse
was that hearings would somehow impede prosecution of the killers of the
civil rights workers-James Cheney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael
Schwerner-who had been killed in Mississippi the previous year), the
Commission held a series of hearings in January 1965. 34 Sheriffs, voter
registrars, and black citizens who had been denied the vote testified to the
sorry record of state authorities in restricting the right to vote. The
combination of the Civil Rights Act, the Commission hearings, and the
wide support for voting rights elsewhere in the country led to a significant
increase in registration that year.
Taylor then became staff director of the Civil Rights Commission,
continuing its work over the next three years of looking into and exposing
the long-established (and quite obvious) legal restrictions on equal rights.
Following the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1964, every southern
county became subject to the law, requiring changes in voting laws and the
dispatch of federal examiners to ensure fair administration of the law.
Taylor notes, "[i]t was also 35
a period when public attention as never before
was focused on civil rights."
The Commission also issued a report on the extent of school
desegregation under the freedom-of-choice plans that local school
authorities had imposed to meet the Brown II implementation decision.
Needless to say, the Commission found that freedom of choice did not have
any significant effect on reducing the segregated pattern of southern
schools.36 The Commission's report was vindicated by the Supreme Court
in its 1968 decision, Green v. School Board of New Kent County.37 In
Green, the Court found that the freedom-of-choice plan put in place by the
school board failed to create a single school system. 38 After three years of
the plan's operation, 85% of African-American children in the school
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Pp.47-53.
Pp.57, 62.
Pp.67-69.
P.79.
Pp.84-86.
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968).

38. Id. at441.
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system still attended the Watkins School, which remained all-black.39 The
Court noted that the dual system was still in place, with the plan's only
accomplishment being a burden on children and their parents-a burden
that Brown 11 placed on the school board.40 Effective change finally
occurred only after the Supreme Court gave district courts the broadest
power to establish effective desegregation plans in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education,4' and federal education agencies refused
to continue financing any school that refused to follow an effective
desegregation plan. Taylor points out that between 1970 and 1980 "black
children made substantial achievement42 gains in reading and closed the
existing gap with whites significantly.,
Of course, the gains of the 1970s and 1980s have not stayed with us,
largely because of white flight and the large percentage of white students
who attend private school.43 In addition, a series of cases decided by the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts limited the desegregation remedies available
to a federal court. 44 The final decision in Freeman v. Pitts requires "goodfaith compliance" with a previously imposed desegregation decree "over a
reasonable period of time. '4 5 If those requirements are met, it creates a
presumption that "the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated
to the extent practicable. '' 4 6 The Court now has before it an important case
that addresses plans to deal with the continued problem of segregated
schools.47
In her concurrence in the 2003 Michigan Law School case, Justice
Id.at 441.
Id.at441-42.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971).
P. 86.
For comprehensive discussion of the problem of white flight, see for example CHARLES T.
CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 81-91 (2004).
515 U.S. 70, 97 (1995) (striking down an interdistrict
44. See Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins 111),
remedy where there was only an intradistrict violation); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1992)
(emphasizing that the Court's obligation extends only to remedy initial de jure segregation); Bd. of
Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (requiring dissolution of desegregation decrees once school
systems reached compliance); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976)
(determining that the District Court's order of readjustment of attendance areas on an annual basis was
an inappropriate remedy that went beyond the court's authority).
45. Freeman,503 U.S. at 498 (1992) (citing Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50).
46. Id. (quoting Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50). For a detailed discussion of Missouri v. Jenkins,
see generally Patricia A. Brannan, Missouri v. Jenkins: The Supreme Court Reconsiders School
Desegregation in Kansas City, Criteriafor Unitary Status, and Remedies Reaching Beyond School
DistrictLines, 39 How. L.J. 781 (1996). Patricia Brannan's firm represented the school district before
the Supreme Court in this case, so her analysis is particularly insightful and well-informed. Id at 781
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

.

n.*

47. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005),
cert.granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908).
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Ginsburg points out that the pattern of desegregating public schools has not
continued. She describes the situation as follows:
As to public education, data for the years 2000-2001 show that
71.6% of African-American children and 76.3% of Hispanic
children attended a school in which minorities made up a
majority of the student body. And schools in predominantly
minority communities lag far behind others measured by the
educational resources available to them.48
Taylor continued to focus on civil rights violations for the Commission
until 1968. During that time the Commission investigated not only housing
discrimination but also the deplorable conditions that minorities faced in
public housing developments in Chicago, Cleveland, San Francisco, and
Rochester, New York. It also exposed discrimination in employment
opportunities in the building industries.
After seven years in government service, Taylor looked for new
horizons. He acknowledged the limited role that lawyers can make in
correcting long-term injustices. "I had come to understand that lawyers like
me could not create the climate that makes major change possible, we could
only use our skills to maximize the benefits of a favorable environment. ''A9
He then spent a year at Yale teaching and writing a book based on his
experiences, Hanging Together. Equality in an Urban Nation.50 After that,
Taylor decided that one way to push for further progress in the civil rights
field was "to mount a real effort for administrative enforcement of civil
rights laws.,, 51 He put together a proposal to the Ford Foundation to set up

a separate organization to accomplish that goal. Catholic University Law
School, led by Clinton Bamberger, agreed to sponsor that program and to
house the new organization.
The Center for National Policy Review was set up in 1970 at Catholic
University. It immediately investigated the regressive policies of the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fanny Mae).52 Among the
regressive policies exposed was that Fanny Mae would only consider a
husband's income in deciding whether to guarantee a loan. Additionally, it
would not make loans in low-income areas unless there were secure and
permanent houses in the immediate areas as well. As a result of the
48. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 345 (2003) (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (internal citation
omitted).
49. P. 97.
50.

WILLIAM L. TAYLOR, HANGING TOGETHER: EQUALITY IN AN URBAN NATION (1971).

51. P. 102.
52. P. 105.
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Center's report, Fanny Mae changed its regulations.53 The Center also
instigated a lawsuit against the Federal Home Loan Bank, which also
refused to assist low-income people despite the requirements of the
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970. It also testified against other
federal lending agencies that refused to adopt pro-civil-rights agendas or
regulations. Reflecting on these events, Taylor acknowledges the difficulty
of ascribing civil rights successes to any single factor, but notes the lasting
impact of the Center's efforts: "I do think that significant change has taken
place . . . . [A]II of this has resulted in easier access to credit for middleclass people of color and in the revival of some neighborhoods. 54
The Center also joined the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights
(LCCR), an umbrella organization that combined many active civil rights
organizations engaging in political agitation. Among those in the LCCR
were significant organizations such as the Urban League and the NAACP.
In addition to pursuing litigation, the LCCR pressed for further legislation
that would benefit its constituents. Among the actions taken by the LCCR
was an attack on discriminatory general revenue sharing, aimed at ensuring
that states receiving federal funds would not use the money to perpetuate
discriminatory programs. LCCR filed suit against the City of Chicago to
block any use of revenue-sharing funds to the55police unless and until it
eliminated job discrimination in the department.
As Taylor focused on housing issues, the problem of school
desegregation continued to fester. The Supreme Court held in a series of
cases that federal courts could order broad remedies against school boards
that had discriminated in the past. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, the Supreme Court upheld a federal court's use of
quotas to achieve racial balance within a school district and further
supported a mandatory bussing plan to meet the quotas.56 However,
judicial control of school board plans was only constitutional when the
district itself engaged in racially discriminatory activity-an unfortunately
common example of which was the setting of school boundary lines
according to racially segregated housing patterns. In 1973, the Supreme
Court made further strides in the arena of school desegregation with its
decision in Keyes v. School District Number 1.57 Keyes marked the first
time the Supreme Court upheld a court-ordered desegregation plan in a
53. P.105-06.
54. P. 108.
55. P. 112.

56. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25, 30 (1971).
57. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Co. 413 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1973) (recognizing that
the practice of constructing a school, knowing it would lead to a segregated school, amounts to creating
a dual school system).
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northern city. 58 In doing so, the court distinguished between de jure
segregation that resulted from deliberate state laws and policies, and de
facto segregation that resulted not from laws, but from the aggregate
choices of individuals.5 9 The next significant hurdle involved the
constitutionally allowable remedies when a central-city school district
engaged in discrimination, but the surrounding suburban school districts did
nothing wrong. Could a federal judge enlist the "innocent" suburban school
district to remedy the unconstitutional acts of an inner-city school district?
This problem arose in Detroit, in a case called Milliken v. Bradley.60 The
Supreme Court found the district court's multidistrict remedy improper
because "without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict
effect, there is no
61
constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy.",
The Milliken decision greatly limited the remedies available for civil
rights lawyers. As indicated in the recent Seattle school district case, the
fact that so many white parents send their children to private schools greatly
alters the racial composition of city school districts.62 In Seattle, the total
population of the city is 70% white and 30% black.63 But the school
population is the reverse-40% white and 60% black. 64 In order to arrange
for greater diversity in the schools, some race-conscious remedies are
65
permissible, as the Supreme Court finally held in Grutter v. Bollinger.
But the law in effect in the 1970s and 1980s greatly limited the power of
federal judges to use such remedies.
As with many of the significant legal battles in the civil rights
movement, Taylor became deeply involved. Taylor found that the solution
to the problem of constitutional limits on court-ordered desegregation plans
was to negotiate better remedies with school districts than the courts were
likely to award. That is precisely what Taylor and the Leadership
Conference sought to accomplish. Taylor describes negotiations in St.
Louis when a resourceful federal judge, William L. Hungate, ordered the
parties to try to work out an interdistrict solution that would reduce the
racial disparity in the inner-city schools. Although legal remedies were
58. For a detailed examination of school desegregation cases, including Keyes, see KEvIN
BROWN, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION ERA 209 (2005).

59. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 200.
60. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
61. Id.
62. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1221 (9th
Cir. 2005) (dissenting opinion) (noting that parents in the affluent northern part of Seattle can afford to
send their children to private school, resulting in"a decreased tax base and public support for District
schools").
63. Id.at 1166 (majority opinion).
64. Id.
65. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
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limited after Milliken, Taylor worked with the NAACP and a mediator
appointed by the judge to work out an acceptable plan. 66 "The results" of
these efforts, Taylor writes, "have been very positive, with black children,
the great majority poor, finishing high school and going on to college at
rates that are two and three times as great as those who remain in racially
and socioeconomically isolated central city schools. 6 7
The issue of voting rights came to the fore after the Supreme Court's
decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden.68 In that case, the Court gave a very
narrow reading to minority voting rights under the Fifteenth Amendment,
holding that there is no violation of the Amendment unless plaintiffs can
show an intent to restrict their voting rights.6 9 Thus, where the city of
Mobile had established an at-large election system in 1911 for choosing its
commissioners-which greatly limited the ability of minority voters to elect
minority representatives-there was no showing of any racially
discriminatory intent. 70 The case was limited by a later decision, Rogers v.
Lodge, where the Court held that failure to correct a racially discriminatory
voting scheme supplied the necessary intent.7'
Rather than try to litigate the issue, Taylor thought the solution was to
convince Congress to pass new legislation that would overrule the City of
Mobile decision. The landmark Voting Rights Act was up for renewal, and
the Leadership Conference tried to include new language that would
eliminate the intent requirement. Taylor describes the difficult negotiations
with Republican lawmakers such as Bob Dole, Henry Hyde, and Hamilton
Fish who were amenable to this change.72
The next major civil rights fight Taylor covers involved the nomination
of Robert Bork as a Supreme Court Justice to replace the moderate Lewis
Powell, who resigned in 1987. 73 Following the resignation of Warren
Burger in 1986, the elevation of Rehnquist to be Chief Justice, and the
selection of Antonin Scalia to fill Rehnquist's seat, Taylor worried that
many of the hard-fought precedents of the Warren Court would be
threatened. When Bork was nominated by President Reagan in 1987, the
entire civil rights-civil liberties movement rose up to block it. Bork was a
recognized scholar, an able court of appeals judge-he had been rated
"exceptionally well-qualified" by the American Bar Association before his
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nomination-and an idol of conservative lawyers throughout the country.74
An elaborate campaign was put together by women's groups, who opposed
his anti-abortion stance, as well as the members of the Leadership
Conference and good government organizations such as People for the
American Way. Taylor took on the assignment of going through all of
Bork's writings to show how out of tune he was with prevailing legal
thought. He also organized constitutional law professors from around the
country to oppose the nomination. Bork behaved in an arrogant manner as
a witness-he claimed that he wanted to become a Supreme Court Justice
because "it would be an intellectual feast., 75 In the end, the Senate defeated
his nomination by a vote of 58 to 42.76
Taylor writes about other legislative fights in the 1980s.77 The
Supreme Court had given a narrow reading to Title IX in Grove City v. Bell,
holding that only the specific college program that received federal funds
was subject to the anti-discriminatory provisions of the law.78 Congress
eventually passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act to reverse that
decision. 79 In the notorious 1988-1989 Term, the Supreme Court handed
down a series of decisions that undermined and gutted the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. 80 Once again, civil rights groups came to Congress to correct
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those decisions, and once again Taylor played a significant role in restoring
the law to what Congress intended.
The last two adventures described in the book involve the Clarence
Thomas nomination to the Supreme Court in 1991 to replace Thurgood
Marshall and Taylor's efforts to save desegregation in the St. Louis
schools. 8' The Thomas nomination split the civil rights coalition. Unlike
the Bork situation, the NAACP delayed taking a position on the
nomination-Thomas after all was African-American. Thomas portrayed
himself as a Horatio Alger hero who rose from poverty in Pin Point,
Georgia, to the highest levels of government. His sparse written record,
unlike Bork's, provided minimal ammunition for his opponents.8 2 The vote
was close, but Thomas won conformation from the Senate.
Taylor's final major account deals with the desegregation of the St.
Louis schools.8 3 The school situation in St. Louis had improved since 1983.
More inner-city black students went to suburban schools. The Supreme
Court had cut back on the ability of federal courts to finance desegregation
remedies in Missouri v. Jenkins (JenkinsI), dealing with schools in Kansas
City, Missouri. 84 Based on that precedent, the State returned to federal
court claiming that it had fulfilled all its obligations under the original
agreement and should not be obliged to pay more. 85 Taylor led the effort to
work out an amicable solution, requiring the State to finance an interdistrict
program (involving both city and suburbs) and to provide additional money
to improve the inner-city schools. However, the measure required that
voters first approve a higher sales tax. 6 The business community put its
full weight behind the solution, and the referendum passed.87
There were other below-the-radar fights that Taylor describes in his
book. Title I of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act had
provided federal funds for inner-city schools. The law came up for renewal
in the 1990s. Along with Ted Kennedy and other supporters, Taylor
worked with the Leadership Conference to insert new standards that states
must apply to insure that funds were properly allocated. 8 He also spent
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considerable time opposing the nomination of John Ashcroft as Attorney
General in 2001. Taylor had first-hand knowledge of Ashcroft because of
the latter's involvement in the St. Louis school desegregation battle.89
Taylor was not successful in this last effort.
Looking back over Taylor's career, there was hardly any significant
civil rights encounter that he did not participate in-Brown v. Board of
Education, Little Rock Central High School, the legislative fight for the
1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the fight over
school desegregation in inner city schools, the Bork and Thomas
nominations to the Supreme Court, and the many legislative fights to
overturn restrictive Supreme Court decisions.
Although he often acted as litigator, Taylor concludes that active
political agitation is a more effective way to achieve equality. "I suspect,"
he notes, "that progress will come by different means in the future. We
may rely less on the courts and more on community organization and
action." 90 Courts do not lead revolutions-except for the brief period when
Chief Justice Earl Warren led the Court. Without the approval of the
political arms of government and the participation of significant activists
who can help shape public opinion, it is virtually impossible to move the
country in a new direction to correct the inequities of the past.
The issue of race will not go away. As noted above, the Supreme
Court has before it this year the question of whether the Seattle school
district can use race as a limited tie-breaker in deciding to what schools
high school students should be assigned. Yet Taylor ends his memoirs on a
note of optimism: "It seems to me," he concludes, "that many people
underestimate their own capacity to effect change. .... I know that there's
a good fight to go to [and] ... [l]acking any talent for retirement, I hope to
stay in the fray as long as I can." 9' Race is still the great dividing line in
American society. And few have endeavored to erase the effects of that line
as often and as devotedly as William Taylor.
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